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I. INTRODUCTION
The meretricious relationship doctrine has received increased
attention in recent years largely due to its application to same-sex
couples' and the national debate on same-sex marriage. However, the
importance of the doctrine, applicable also to heterosexual couples, 2
extends beyond this recent focus. The number of unmarried, committed
persons cohabitating has been increasing rapidly. Over eleven million
people reported being unmarried but living with a partner in 2000, 3 an
increase of seventy-two percent since 1990. 4 As the number of unmarried
persons cohabitating increases, so will the importance of the doctrine.5
The meretricious relationship doctrine 6 is a judicially-created
equitable doctrine that allows unmarried committed persons who
cohabitate to acquire an interest in property accumulated during the
relationship, regardless of which partner holds legal title. 7 Upon
t J.D. candidate, 2006, Seattle University School of Law; B.A., University of Puget Sound, 2000.
The author thanks the partners at Rumbaugh, Rideout, Barnett & Adkins for their assistance with
this Article, his family for their continued support, and, most importantly his wife, Shari, for her
unfailing love and patience.
1. See Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 145 Wash. 2d 103, 33 P.3d 735 (2001) (dictum); Gormley v.
Robertson, 120 Wash. App. 31, 83 P.3d 1042 (2004).
2. In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d 299, 678 P.2d 328 (1984) (applying the
meretricious relationship doctrine to a relationship involving a heterosexual couple).
3. Alternatives to Marriage Project, Statistics, http://www.unmarried.org/statistics.html (last
visited Nov. 19, 2004) (citing U.S. Census Bureau 2000).
4. Id.
5. Presumably, this is because, as the number of unmarried persons cohabiting increases, the
claims brought under the meretricious relationship doctrine will likewise increase.
6. Although the term "meretricious" historically had a demeaning connotation, presently the
word is a term of art and is in no way intended to be demeaning. See Peffiley-Warner v. Bowen, 113
Wash. 2d 243, 247 n.5, 778 P.2d 1022, 1024 n.5 (1989).
7. See Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d at 306, 678 P.2d at 331.
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termination of the relationship, a court will apply this doctrine to divide
the property equitably.8
The current status of the meretricious relationship doctrine in
Washington State is fundamentally underdeveloped and leaves many
questions unresolved. For example, does the meretricious doctrine create
a present inchoate property interest in the non-title-holding partner? Does
a non-title-holding meretricious partner have management rights over
property jointly-acquired? Does a tort claim against the non-title-holding
partner create a third party creditor's interest in the property of the title-
holding partner that was jointly-acquired? Does the meretricious doctrine
apply post mortem?
This Article, primarily concerned with the last question posed
above, will illustrate that the meretricious relationship doctrine should be
applied post mortem. Specifically, the meretricious relationship doctrine
should apply (1) to the survivor of a meretricious relationship when the
relationship terminates by the death of the other partner, (2) to the estates
of the meretricious partners when both partners have died
simultaneously, and (3) to the estate of a meretricious partner when the
relationship terminates by that partner's death. The debate over whether
the meretricious relationship doctrine should be applied post mortem
centers on whether applying the doctrine post mortem will contravene
Washington's intestacy laws, 9 which do not provide any inheritance
rights for unmarried cohabitants. 0
This Article does not argue that a surviving meretricious partner
can inherit under Washington's intestate laws, l l nor does it argue that the
Washington State Legislature should amend intestacy laws so that a
surviving meretricious partner could inherit directly from a decedent's
estate. 12 Rather, this Article argues that the meretricious relationship
doctrine creates a present inchoate unliquidated property interest in the
non-title holding partner which cannot be dissolved at death.' 3 When the
relationship terminates by the death of one of the partners, the inchoate
8. Id.
9. See Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 145 Wash. 2d 103, 108-09, 33 P.3d 735, 738-39 (2001)
(property distribution of an intestate is governed by intestacy law, not the meretricious relationship
doctrine) (Alexander, C.J., concurring).
10. Peffley- Warner, 113 Wash. 2d at 253, 778 P.2d at 1027; see infra Part Ill.
11 . Such an argument would clearly conflict with Peffley-Warner, which held that a
meretricious partner is not a "spouse" for purposes of inheritance under Washington's intestacy
laws. Id. at 253, 778 P.2d at 1027.
12. Although this might be a good idea, such an argument is beyond the scope of this article.
For an article addressing this issue, see E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-Factor Approach to
Intestate Inheritance Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners, 81 OR. L. REV. 255 (2002).
13. See discussion infra Part V.D.1.
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interests of the non-title holding partner vest. Property subject to the
inchoate interest, having vested, does not become part of the title-holding
decedent's estate. The surviving partner, therefore, does not inherit from
the estate, but is rather liquidating his or her property interest created
under the meretricious relationship doctrine. Since the surviving partner
does not inherit from the decedent's estate, applying the doctrine post
mortem does not conflict with intestacy laws. Additionally, to apply the
doctrine post mortem advances its purpose 14 because the doctrine was
created to prevent unjust enrichment. 15 To apply the doctrine post
mortem prevents unjust enrichment of either the title-holding survivor or
the title-holding decedent's estate, as the case may be. 16 Further, the
doctrine should apply post mortem because it is an equitable doctrine,
and the equities involved do not change simply because a relationship
terminates by death rather than by separation or marriage. 17
To not apply the doctrine post mortem would cause a non-title-
holding survivor to suffer severe inequities while unjustly enriching the
estate of the deceased partner. If two people live in a meretricious
relationship in which all the assets of the couple are held in one partner's
name and that partner dies, the survivor would lose his or her equitable
interest in property jointly-acquired, and thus own absolutely nothing.
The title-holding decedent's assets, absent a valid will, will be distributed
to the decedent's issue, parents, siblings, grandparents, or cousins.1 8
Likewise, if a meretricious relationship terminates by the death of
the non-title-holding partner and the meretricious doctrine does not apply
post mortem, the title-holding survivor will be unjustly enriched at the
expense of the decedent's heirs. Similarly, if a meretricious relationship
terminates by the simultaneous deaths of the partners, the estate of the
title-holding partner will be unjustly enriched to the detriment of the non-
title-holding partner's estate if the doctrine does not apply post mortem.
Imagine a man and woman who cohabitated for many years, but all
of the couple's assets were in the male partner's name. Imagine further
that each partner had a child from a previous relationship. If both
partners later die in a car accident, and if the meretricious relationship
doctrine does not apply post mortem, the woman's child will not inherit
14. See discussion infra Part V.D.4.
15. Peffley- Warner, 113 Wash. 2d at 252, 778 P.2d at 1026 (discussing In re Marriage of
Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d 299, 678 P.2d 328 (1984)).
16. See discussion infra Part V.D.4.
17. See discussion infra Part V.D.4.
18. See discussion infra Part III (discussing property distribution under Washington's intestacy
laws, WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04 (2004)).
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anything, since the woman did not own anything in her name.1 9 The child
of the male partner will inherit all of the assets.20 If, on the other hand,
the doctrine applies post mortem, the woman's inchoate interest in the
assets will have vested upon the termination of the relationship (i.e., the
death of the male partner), and thus, will pass to her child either through
a valid will or intestacy laws.2 1
In Section 11, this Article will examine the evolution of the
meretricious relationship doctrine beginning with the abolition of
common law marriage, the adoption of the Creasman presumption,2 2 the
creation of the modem meretricious relationship doctrine in In re
Marriage of Lindsey,2 3 and finally to the present state of the doctrine.
Section III explores Washington's intestacy laws and argues that those
laws do not preclude applying the meretricious relationship doctrine post
mortem. In Section IV, this Article addresses the possibility of creating a
will to control property disposition at death and demonstrates that the
option of drafting a will is not an adequate solution to the problem
meretricious relationship equity was meant to address. Finally, Section V
argues that the meretricious relationship doctrine should apply post
mortem.
II. THE MERETRICIOUS RELATIONSHIP DOCTRINE
A. Evolution of the Doctrine
An understanding of why the meretricious relationship doctrine
should be applied post mortem requires an appreciation of the evolution
and purposes of the doctrine. The historical inequities that the doctrine
was created to address demonstrate that these same inequities continue to
exist in the post mortem context.
1. Common Law Marriage
The meretricious doctrine evolved from the Creasman presumption,
which developed after the abolition of common law marriage.24 Common
law marriage was based on the concept of a civil contract,25 and its rules
19. See discussion infra Part IIl.
20. See discussion infra Part 111.
21. See discussion infra Part V.
22. Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948).
23. 101 Wash. 2d 299, 678 P.2d 328 (1984).
24. See discussion infra Part II.A. 1-2.
25. In re Estate of McLaughlin, 4 Wash. 570, 573, 30 P. 651, 652 (1892) (citing Meister v.
Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1877)).
[Vol. 29:1
Meretricious Relationship Doctrine Post Mortem
varied depending on the jurisdiction. 26 Some states only required
evidence that a couple was capable of contracting and that the couple did
in fact agree, either orally or in writing, to be husband and wife.27 Other
states required that there be some ceremony or celebration in addition to
an implicit contract.28 In a few jurisdictions courts held that a common
law marriage existed when there was evidence of cohabitation and
additional evidence showing the couple held themselves out to the public
as husband and wife. 2
9
There were various reasons why the courts adopted the doctrine of
common law marriage. One reason was the belief that marriage derived
from a natural right that every human possessed.30 This belief, coupled
with the concept of freedom of contract, commanded that a person's right
to marry need not depend on a government license.31 Another reason was
that public policy favored marriage over illicit relationships, and
therefore, courts should resolve uncertainty about cohabitants' marital
status in favor of finding them married.32 A third reason for the doctrine
of common law marriage was to protect children. If a court found a
cohabiting couple was not married, then any children the couple had
were born out of wedlock, and thus illegitimate.33
Despite the reasons favoring common law marriage, some state
legislatures enacted statutes severely limiting common law marriage;
others eliminated the institution completely. 34 Many of these statutory
limitations included a requirement of some form of solemnization by a
person authorized to perform such ceremony, a ceremony to take place in
front of two witnesses, 35 and/or a certificate of marriage. 36
State legislatures and courts provided four main reasons for limiting
or abolishing common law marriage. One reason was to secure reliable
evidence by which the marriage could be proved to prevent fraud and
litigation. 3 Another reason for establishing formalities for a valid
26. See id.
27. Id. at 581, 30 P. at 655 (citing Norcross v. Norcross, 29 N.E. 506 (Mass. 1892)).
28. Id. at 578, 30 P. at 654 (citing Beverlin v. Beverlin, 3 S.E. 36 (Va. 1887)).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 576, 30 P. at 657 (citing Askew v. Dupree, 30 Ga. 173 (1860)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 584, 30 P. at 656 (citing Dickerson v. Brown, 49 Miss. 357 (Miss. 1873)).
33. Id. at 574, 30 P. at 653 (citing Parton v. Hervey, 67 Mass. (I Gray) 119 (Mass. 1854)).
34. See Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1877) (holding that a state statute requiring persons to
obtain a marriage license to be validly married abrogated common law marriage).
35. McLaughlin, 4 Wash. at 581, 30 P. at 655 (citing Holmes v. Holmes, 12 F. Cas. 405 (C.C.
Or. 1870)).
36. Id. at 575, 30 P. at 653 (citing Meister, 96 U.S. 76).
37. Id. at 581, 30 P. at 655 (citing Holmes, 12 F. Cas. 405).
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marriage was that doing so did not seem unreasonable; 38 since there were
formalities required for simple transactions, such as transferring personal
property, courts and legislatures believed it was not unreasonable to
require formalities for marriage. 39 Further, marriage was viewed as
sacred, and therefore, not be entered into lightly.40 Requiring certain
procedures encouraged people to consider the importance of the
commitment before entering into a marriage.4'
Third, imposing statutory requirements for a valid marriage was
also used as a means to enforce public policy. For example, many
legislatures and courts disfavored illicit relationships and cohabitation.42
It was thought that abolishing common law marriage would actually
reduce the number of illicit and cohabitory relationships.43 These courts
assumed that many couples cohabitated for the purpose of getting
married. These courts also assumed that social stigma would encourage
people to abide by the statutory requirements.44
Washington State outlawed common law marriage 45 in In the
Matter of the Estate of McLaughlin.46 McLaughlin involved a statute
establishing requirements for marriage.47 The court held that the statute
provided the exclusive manner in which Washington State citizens could
legally marry; therefore, it deemed that the statute abolished common
law marriage.48
2. The Creasman Presumption
Although one of the purposes of abolishing common law marriage
was to discourage cohabitation and strengthen the institution of
marriage,49 people continued to cohabitate despite the fact that the law
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 590, 30 P. at 658.
41. Id. at 591-92, 30 P. at 658-59.
42. See id. at 584, 30 P. at 656 (citing Lewis v. Ames, 44 Tex. 319 (1875)).
43. Id. at 590, 30 P. at 658.
44. Id. at 588, 30 P. at 657 (citing Askew v. Dupree, 30 Ga. 173 (1860)).
45. Washington State recognizes common law marriages validly entered into in other states. In
re Pennington, 142 Wash. 2d 592, 600 n.6, 14 P.3d 764, 769 n.6 (2000).
46.4 Wash. 570, 30 P. 651 (1892).
47. Wash. Gen. St. §§ 1381-1389 (required persons performing marriage ceremonies be
authorized to do so; persons getting married must obtain a license; and if the female is under
eighteen or the male is under twenty-one years of age, the State shall not issue a license except on
the consent of under aged person's parent or guardian). One of the purposes of the statute was to
prevent illicit relationships between men and underage girls. See McLaughlin, 4 Wash. at 589-90, 30
P. at 658-59.
48. McLaughlin, 4 Wash. at 589-90, 30 P. at 658-59.
49. Id. at 576, 30 P. at 653 (citing Askew v. Dupree, 30 Ga. 173 (1860)).
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would not recognize them as being married. 50 This unexpected response
created a new problem. Often a couple would cohabitate and jointly
acquire property, but the title to the property would be held in only one
partner's name. When the couple later separated, the non-title-holding
partner would desire to receive his or her alleged interest in such
property. 51 Thus, due to the fact the legislature abolished common law
marriage, the courts had to address the issue of how to distribute property
that non-married cohabitants jointly accumulated during their
relationship.52
The Washington State Supreme Court addressed this issue in
Engstrom v. Peterson,5 3 where the court held that property acquired by a
man and a woman not married to each other, but living together as
husband and wife, is not community property, and in the absence of
some trust relationship, 54 the property belongs to the one who held legal
title.5 5
The supreme court was confronted with a similar question in
Buckley v. Buckley.56 In that case the issue was whether a woman had
any interest in jointly-acquired property that was in her partner's name
when she believed they were legally married, but, unbeknownst to her,
the marriage was void because her husband was legally married to
another woman.57 The court made an exception to the Engstrom rule and
held that, even though there was no lawful marriage between the parties,
if either or both of them, in good faith, entered into a marriage with the
other, and such marriage proves to be void, a court of equity will protect
the rights of the innocent party in the property accumulated by their joint
efforts.58
Engstrom and Buckley provide the framework for the birth of the
Creasman presumption. In Creasman v. Boyle, the court adopted a
bright-line rule: in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed
50. See Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96 P. 1079 (1908) (involving a couple who
cohabitated despite the abolishment of common law marriage).
51. See id.
52. See Engstrom v. Peterson, 107 Wash. 523, 182 P. 623 (1919).
53. Id.
54. A trust relationship is a fiduciary relationship regarding property and subjecting the person
with title to the property to equitable duties to deal with it for another's benefit. A trust arises as a
result of a manifestation of an intention to create it. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1513 (7th ed. 1999).
See also Omerv. Omer, II Wash. App. 386, 393,407 P.2d 957, 961 (1965).
55. Engstrom, 107 Wash. 531, 182 P. 562. This was the original case creating the meretricious
doctrine.
56. 50 Wash. 213, 96 P. 1079 (1908).
57. Id. at 214-15, 96 P. at 1080.
58. Id. at 217, 96 P. at 1081.
2005]
Seattle University Law Review
as a matter of law that the parties intended to dispose of the property
exactly as they did.59 Thus, the party who held title to the property in
question was the only party that had a legal interest in it, absent a
showing of intent to dispose of the property otherwise.60 In that case,
Harvey Creasman and Caroline Paul cohabitated for seven years holding
themselves out as husband and wife. 61 When their relationship
terminated at Caroline's death,62 they owned, among other miscellaneous
items, a parcel of land and a savings account worth a substantial amount
of money, both in Caroline's name.63 However, the real property was
paid for with Harvey's earnings, and the savings account was wholly
comprised of Harvey's earnings.64 Harvey petitioned the court to obtain
title to the property and bank account. 65 The trial court found that the
couple lived in a marital-like relationship, and each materially
contributed to the accumulation of the assets.6 6 Therefore, it partitioned
the property as if it were community property, distributing a one-half
interest in the real property and bank account to Harvey and a one-half
67 6interest to Caroline's estate. The supreme court reversed,68 reasoning
that the Buckley exception did not apply since there was no question of
good faith or innocent mistake on the part of Harvey or Caroline. 69
Furthermore, the court held that the parties clearly did not intend to enter
into a marriage. 70 The parties were deemed fully aware of their
unmarried status, and therefore, the Engstrom rule prohibited the trial
court from distributing the property to Harvey. 71 The court reasoned that
since the parties presumably knew the current state of the law and chose
to put their jointly-acquired property in the name of only one of them,
they must have intended that person to be the separate legal owner of
such property.72
59. 31 Wash. 2d 345, 358, 196 P.2d 835, 841-42 (1948).
60. Id. at 356-57, 196 P.2d at 841-42.
61. Id. at 346-47, 196 P.2d at 836-37.
62. Id. at 348, 196 P.2d at 837.
63. Id. at 346-47, 196 P.2d at 836-37.
64. Id. at 348, 196 P.2d at 837.
65. Id. at 348-50, 196 P.2d at 837-38.
66. Id. at 350, 196 P.2d at 838.
67. Id. at 351, 196 P.2d at 838.
68. Id. at 358, 196 P.2d at 842.
69. Id. at 352-53, 196 P.2d at 839.
70. Id. at 353, 196 P.2d at 839.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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3. Exceptions to the Creasman Presumption
The Creasman presumption was in effect for thirty-six years with
regard to disposition of cohabitants' property after separation.73 However,
the presumption was rarely used to prohibit an equitable distribution to a
non-title-holding partner. Rather, courts created the following exceptions
to the presumption to allow for such distributions: (1) where the title to
property accumulated during a meretricious relationship could be traced
to the separate property of one of the parties, 74 (2) where the parties were
involved in a joint venture or implied contract, 75 (3) where the court
found a constructive equitable trust,76 or (4) where the cohabitants had
77entered'into a valid contract. These exceptions were, in one way or
another, justified by the actual or inferred intent of the parties. In fact, the
supreme court stated that the Creasman presumption only arises "when
there is an absence of evidence as to intention., 78
4. The Current Meretricious Relationship Doctrine
The Creasman presumption was explicitly overruled in In re
Marriage of Lindsey, and the meretricious relationship doctrine was
created, for the most part, as it exits today.79 In that case, the parties had
73. The case created the Creasman presumption in 1948, and the presumption was not
overruled until In re Marriage ofLindsey in 1984.
74. Shull v. Shepherd, 63 Wash. 2d 503, 508, 387 P.2d 767 (1963) (when property is acquired
by contributions of two or more parties, courts will presume that they intended to share the property
in proportion to the amount contributed when the funds can be traced, otherwise they share the
property equally).
75. In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 81-82, 499 P.2d 864 (1972) (to establish an
implied partnership a plaintiff need only show that a contract of partnership can be implied from the
facts and circumstances of the case. No express contract needs to be proven. The fact that a
meretricious relationship cannot give rise to community property does not prevent a plaintiff from
establishing an implied partnership contract. The existence of a meretricious relationship does not
affect the application of the general law of partnerships).
76. Omer v. Omer, II Wash. App. 386, 393-94, 407 P.2d 967 (1965) (holding that the male
partner held title to property in a constructive trust for the benefit of his female partner. The couple
was previously married in a foreign country and subsequently divorced to gain U.S. citizenship. The
couple then lived in a meretricious relationship until they separated ten years later. During the
meretricious relationship, the female partner gave her paychecks to the male who then purchased
property. The court concluded that the male partner had an equitable duty to convey some of the
property to the female partner).
77. Dahlgren v. Vlomeen, 49 Wash. 2d 47, 54-55, 298 P.2d 479 (1956) (holding that, absent
some form of trust relationship, courts will presume that meretricious partners have placed title to
their property exactly where they want it to be. Since this presumption is rebuttable and the
respondent relies on a written agreement made out by the decedent to bequeath her property to him,
Creasman v. Boyle did not apply).
78. West v. Knowles, 50 Wash. 2d 311,313, 311 P.2d 689 (1957).
79. In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d 299, 678 P.2d 328 (1984).
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cohabitated for over a year and a half before they were married.80 During
the time they were cohabitating, the male partner owned a large parcel of
land on which the couple built a barn. 81 After approximately four and
one-half years of marriage, the couple filed for divorce. 2 After this filing
but before the dissolution was granted, the barn burned down, and Mr.
Lindsey recovered over $85,000 in insurance proceeds.83 Ms. Lindsey
claimed she had an interest in the insurance proceeds because she
assisted in building and painting the barn.84 The trial court, relying on the
Creasman presumption, held that the barn and thus the insurance
proceeds belong solely to Mr. Lindsey since the barn was constructed
prior to marriage. 85 Because the barn was built on his separate property,
the court chose not to examine whether Ms. Lindsey had an equitable
86 Lideinterest in the property. Ms. Lindsey appealed and argued that the
Creasman presumption should be overruled.8 7 The Washington State
Supreme Court agreed, concluding that the presumption was"unpredictable" and "onerous."8 8 The court adopted a new rule and stated
that "courts must 'examine the [meretricious] relationship and the
property accumulations and make a just and equitable disposition of the
property."' 89 The court listed several factors that should be considered
when determining whether a meretricious relationship existed, which
include continuous cohabitation, the duration of the relationship, the
purpose of the relationship, and the pooling of resources and services. 9°
These factors were not intended to create any "rigid set of requirements,"
but were to assist courts on a case-by-case basis.9' The court also stated
that RCW 26.09.08092 should be used by analogy to distribute the
80. Id. at 300, 678 P.2d at 329.
81. Id. at 300, 306, 678 P.2d at 329, 332.
82. Id. at 300, 678 P.2d at 329.
83. Id. at 301, 306, 678 P.2d at 329, 332.
84. Id. at 306, 678 P.2d at 332.
85. Id. at 301-02, 678 P.2d at 329-30.
86. Id. at 301-02, 307, 678 P.2d at 329-30, 332.
87. Id. at 304, 678 P.2d at 33 1.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 304-05, 678 P.2d at 331 (in analyzing these factors, a court will look to see whether
the relationship was stable, fairly established by longevity, whether the purpose was to enter into a
committed relationship, and whether the partners used their resources and services for the couple's
joint benefit).
91. Id. at 305, 678 P.2d at 331.
92. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (2004) instructs how a court should distribute the
community and separate property of a married couple after dissolution. It provides in relevant part:
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage ... the court shall, without regard to marital
misconduct, make such disposition of the property and the liabilities of the properties,
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property of meretricious partners who have separated. 93 Since neither
party contested that their relationship prior to marriage was meretricious,
the court held that the trial court erred in not considering whether Ms.
Lindsey had an equitable interest in the property.94
The meretricious relationship doctrine as espoused in Lindsey was
further developed in Connell v. Francisco 95 where the court
characterized a meretricious relationship as a stable, marital-like
relationship where both parties cohabitate with the knowledge that a
lawful marriage between them does not exist. 96 The court also added
"intent of the parties"'97 to the list of factors used to determine whether
the facts of a particular case establish that a meretricious relationship
existed.
With regard to what property may be distributed under the
meretricious doctrine, the Connell court held that the meretricious
doctrine applies to property acquired during the meretricious relationship,
not separate property obtained prior to the relationship. 98 The court
reasoned that while RCW 26.09.08099 applies to property distribution
.under the meretricious relationship doctrine by analogy,100 the parties in
such a relationship decided not to get married, and thus, property owned
by each party prior to the relationship should not be subject to
distribution. 101 The implicit rationale of the court was that since the
parties decided not to get married, they likely did not intend their partner
to have an interest in their separate property. 10 2 Additionally, the court
either community or separate, as shall appear just and equitable after considering all
relevant factors including, but not limited to:
(1) The nature and extent of the community property;
(2) The nature and extent of the separate property;
(3) The duration of the marriage; and
(4) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property
is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right
to live therein for reasonable periods to a spouse with whom the children reside the
majority of the time.
93. Lindsey, 101 Wash.2d at 306, 678 P.2d at 332.
94. Id. at 307, 678 P.2d at 332.
95. 127 Wash.2d 339, 898 P.2d 831 (1995).
96. Id. at 346, 898 P.2d at 834.
97. Id. (stating that the court will look to see if the parties intended to live in a stable, marital-
like relationship).
98. Id. at 350, 898 P.2d at 836.
99. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (1989) requires all the property owned by a couple seeking
a divorce, both community and separate, to be before the court for an equitable distribution.
100. See Lindsey 101 Wash. 2d at 306, 678 P.2d at 332.
101. Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 349, 898 P.2d at 835-36.
102. Id.
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reasoned that equitable distribution of the separate property of the
meretricious partners, which would afford such couples the same rights
as married partners, came too close to re-creating common law
marriage. 103 The critical question, according to the court, is whether the
property would have been characterized as community property had the
parties been married. 104 Once it is established that a meretricious
relationship exists, there is a rebuttable presumption that all property
acquired during the relationship is jointly owned by both partners, and
thus, subject to a just and equitable distribution by the courts.10 5
Therefore, under Connell, a meretricious relationship doctrine
analysis consists of three steps: (1) the trial court must determine
whether a meretricious relationship existed, (2) if there was such a
relationship, the trial court must evaluate the interest each party has in
the property acquired during the relationship, and (3) the trial court then,
based on the information obtained, makes a just and equitable
distribution of such property.l16
The Washington Supreme Court has held that a meretricious
relationship is not the same as a marriage. 0 7 Thus, partners in such a
relationship do not qualify for certain statutory or contractual benefits
afforded to married persons.' 0 8 For example, a meretricious partner does
not qualify for benefits triggered by a "marital status" provision under
Washington's unemployment compensation statute. 109 Further, a
meretricious partner is not entitled to attorney fees in a meretricious
relationship property distribution case under Wash. Rev. Code §
26.09.140,110 which permits an award of attomey fees in a marriage
dissolution cause of action."' A cohabitant is also not considered a
member of an insured's "immediate family" for purposes of insurance
benefits. 112 Additionally, a meretricious partner is not considered a
103. Id. at 349, 898 P.2d at 836.
104. Id. at 349, 898 P.2d at 835-36.
105. Id. at 351, 898 P.2d at 836. This presumption is basically the exact opposite of the
Creasman presumption.
106. See In re Pennington, 142 Wash.2d 592, 601, 14 P.3d 764, 770 (2000) (laying out these
three factors citing Connell).
107. Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 348, 898 P.2d at 835.
108. Id. at 348, 898 P.2d at 835.
109. Id. (citing Davis v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 108 Wash. 2d 272, 278-79, 737 P.2d
1262, 1266-67 (1987)).
110. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.140 (1973).
111. Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 348-49, 898 P.2d at 835 (citing W. Cmty. Bank v. Helmer, 48
Wash. App. 694, 740 P.2d 359 (1987)).
112. Id. at 349, 898 P.2d at 835 (citing Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Weaver, 48 Wash. App. 607, 612,
739 P.2d 1192 (1987)).
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"spouse" for purposes of Washington's wrongful death statute." 3 Lastly,
if a meretricious relationship is terminated by the death of one partner,
the surviving partner cannot inherit from the estate of the decedent under
Washington's intestacy laws.' 1
4
Since the meretricious relationship doctrine is not considered to be
synonymous with marriage, it has been applied to same sex couples." 5
The Washington State Court of Appeals strictly applied the factors and
determined that they equally apply to heterosexuals and homosexuals
because all of the factors espoused by Connell are neutral on the issue of
same sex relationships and the capability of marrying legally." 16
Although the case law since Lindsey has clarified the meretricious
relationship doctrine substantially, it is currently less than clear whether
the doctrine can be applied post mortem. 117 Although no reported
appellate court opinion has explicitly held the meretricious relationship
doctrine does or does not apply post mortem, two Washington State
Supreme Court Justices believe that applying the meretricious
relationship doctrine post mortem would thwart Washington's intestacy
laws. 18 However, Washington's intestacy laws create a framework
which demonstrates that applying the meretricious relationship doctrine
post mortem will not circumvent intestacy laws."19
III. INTESTACY LAWS
Intestacy laws provide a scheme to distribute a person's property
when that person dies without a valid will 120 and date back to biblical
113. Id. (citing Roe v. Ludtke Trucking, Inc., 46 Wash. App. 816, 732 P.2d 1021 (1987)).
114. Peffley-Wamer v. Bowen, 113 Wash. 2d 243, 778 P.2d 1022 (1989).
115. See, e.g., Gormley v. Robertson, 120 Wash. App. 31, 83 P.3d 1042 (2004); see also
Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 145 Wash. 2d 103, 107, 33 P.3d 735, 737 (2001) (in dictum the court stated
that equitable claims are not dependent on the "legality" of the relationship between the parties, nor
are they limited by the gender or sexual orientation of the parties).
116. Gormley, 120 Wash. App. at 37, 83 P.3d at 1045. The court further reasoned that,
although one of the factors is that the couple lived in a marital-like relationship, this factor referred
to the behavior of the meretricious partners, not the legal ability to marry. In fact, one of the factors
is that the partners know that they are not legally married.
117. See Vasquez, 145 Wash. 2d at 108-15, 33 P.3d at 738-41 (two members of the supreme
court believe that the meretricious relationship doctrine is unavailable to a party who seeks relief
when one party to the alleged meretricious relationship is deceased) (Alexander, C.J. and Sanders, J.,
in separate concurring opinions).
118. Id.
119. The two concurring justices in Vasquez believe that applying the meretricious doctrine
post mortem violates Washington's intestacy laws, a position more fully addressed in discussion
infra Part V.A.
120. WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS 20 (3d ed.
1960).
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times when Israelites were afforded intestate succession rights. 121 The
primary purpose of creating intestacy laws is to distribute the decedent's
estate according to his or her probable donative intent. 122 Other purposes
include protecting the financially dependent family, 123 rewarding
economic investment, 124 and ensuring a fast and fair distribution of
property. 125
Under the vast majority of states' intestacy laws, unmarried
cohabitants who survive their partner do not have a right to inherit from
their partner's estate. 126 As of 1998, eleven states and the District of
Columbia recognized common law marriage, and afforded qualifying
partners the right to inherit under the intestacy laws.' 27 Four states offer
intestate succession rights to surviving meretricious partners who meet
certain criteria.128
In Washington, unmarried cohabitants have no right to inherit from
their partners' estates. 129A decedent's property will be distributed
according to Washington's intestacy laws if such person dies without a
valid will. 13° A surviving spouse has the right to inherit the totality or a
majority of the intestate's property depending whether the intestate is
survived by issue, parents, or siblings. 31 The term "spouse" has been
121. The intestate scheme the Israelites followed was: If a man dies and leaves no son, turn his
inheritance over to his daughter; if he has no daughter, give his inheritance to his brothers; if he has
no brothers, give his inheritance to his father's brothers; if his father had no brothers, give his
inheritance to the nearest relative in his clan, that he may possess it. This is to be a legal requirement
for the Israelites, as the Lord commanded Moses. Numbers 27:8-11 (NIV).
122. Id.
123. Cristy G. Lomenzo, Note, A Goal-Based Approach to Drafting Intestacy Provisions for
Heirs Other than the Surviving Spouse, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 941, 947 (1995).
124. Id. at 946-47.
125. Id. at 947.
126. See, e.g. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.015 (2004); see infra note 131.
127. See AM LAW INST., Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and
Recommendations 6.02 cmt. a (2002) (explaining that, as of 1998, only eleven states and the District
of Columbia recognize common law marriage).
128. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-1, 560:2-102
Supp. (2001); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6401(c) (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (1992).
129. See Peffley-Warner v. Bowen, 113 Wash. 2d 243, 778 P.2d 1022 (1989).
130. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.015 (2004).
131. Id. This statute provides how property of a decedent will be distributed if such decedent
dies intestate. The statute provides in its entirety:
The net estate of a person dying intestate, or that portion thereof with respect to which the
person shall have died intestate, shall descend subject to the provisions of RCW
11.04.250 and 11.02.070, and shall be distributed as follows:
(1) Share of surviving spouse. The surviving spouse shall receive the following share:
(a) All of the decedent's share of the net community estate; and
(b) One-half of the net separate estate if the intestate is survived by issue; or
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strictly construed to include only legally married persons., 32 If there is no
surviving spouse, the property will be distributed to the decedent's issue,
parents, siblings, grandparents, or cousins. 133 If one partner in a
meretricious relationship dies intestate, the surviving partner cannot
inherit any of the decedent's estate through the intestate laws. 134 In fact,
the estate will escheat to the state if the decedent left no heirs rather than
be distributed to the surviving meretricious partner. 135
IV. WILLS
A person is free to devise his or her property through a will. 136
However, many people fail to make valid wills. 137 This is likely due to
(c) Three-quarters of the net separate estate if there is no surviving issue, but the
intestate is survived by one or more of his parents, or by one or more of the issue of one
or more of his parents; or
(d) All of the net separate estate, if there is no surviving issue nor parent nor issue
of parent.
(2) Shares of others than surviving spouse. The share of the net estate not distributable to
the surviving spouse, or the entire net estate if there is no surviving spouse, shall descend
and be distributed as follows:
(a) To the issue of the intestate; if they are all in the same degree of kinship to the
intestate, they shall take equally, or if of unequal degree, then those of more remote
degree shall take by representation.
(b) If the intestate not be survived by issue, then to the parent or parents who
survive the intestate.
(c) If the intestate not be survived by issue or by either parent, then to those issue of
the parent or parents who survive the intestate; if they are all in the same degree of
kinship to the intestate, they shall take equally, or, if of unequal degree, then those of
more remote degree shall take by representation.
(d) If the intestate not be survived by issue or by either parent, or by any issue of the
parent or parents who survive the intestate, then to the grandparent or grandparents who
survive the intestate; if both maternal and paternal grandparents survive the intestate, the
maternal grandparent or grandparents shall take one-half and the paternal grandparent or
grandparents shall take one-half.
(e) Ifthe intestate not be survived by issue or by either parent, or by any issue of the
parent or parents or by any grandparent or grandparents, then to those issue of any
grandparent or grandparents who survive the intestate; taken as a group, the issue of the
maternal grandparent or grandparents shall share equally with the issue of the paternal
grandparent or grandparents, also taken as a group; within each such group, all members
share equally if they are all in the same degree of kinship to the intestate, or, if some be
of unequal degree, then those of more remote degree shall take by representation.
132. Peffley- Warner, 113 Wash. 2d 243, 778 P.2d 1022.
133. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.015(2) (2004); see infra note 134.
134. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.015 (2004) (this statute does not provide any distribution
rights in surviving meretricious partners, and the Peffley-Warner court held that surviving
meretricious partners are not "spouses" for the purposes of intestate distribution).
135. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.140 (2004).
136. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.010 (2004); In re Meagher's Estate, 60 Wash. 2d 691, 375
P.2d 148 (1962) (right to dispose of one's property by will is not only a valuable right, but is one
assured by law and protected by statute).
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the failure to plan ahead, procrastination, or to the erroneous assumption
that intestacy laws are sufficient. 138 While unmarried individuals can
devise all their property to whomever they want, 139 married persons can
only devise their separately owned property and their one-half interest in
community property. 140 All property acquired during marriage is
community property unless the property comes within a specifically
enumerated exception (e.g., gift or inheritance).141
A couple in a meretricious relationship can protect each other's
interests by creating a valid will and devising all or part of each other's
estate to the other partner. 142 Unfortunately, many people do not take
such precautions.1 43 Further, a meretricious partner could devise all of his
or her assets, including assets acquired through joint efforts during the
relationship, to the exclusion of the meretricious partner. 144 This would
work an injustice to the survivor and would result in unjust enrichment of
the devisees. A married person does not have this right; he or she cannot
devise all of the property acquired during the marriage.1 4' Thus, if a
meretricious relationship terminates in the death of one partner, absent a
will devising the decedent's assets to the surviving partner, the surviving
partner has no legal recourse under Washington's intestacy laws to
protect assets he or she would otherwise be entitled to under the
meretricious relationship doctrine. The decedent's estate would therefore
be unjustly enriched by property the surviving non-title holding partner
helped accumulate. To apply the meretricious relationship doctrine post
mortem would prevent this unjust enrichment.
V. ARGUMENT-APPLYING THE MERETRICIOUS
DOCTRINE POST MORTEM
As previously stated, the meretricious relationship doctrine is an
equitable tool used to distribute a non-married couple's property after the
relationship has terminated. A meretricious relationship can terminate in
137. See Lomenzo, supra note 123, at 943-45, 944 n. 14.
138. See E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-Factor Approach to Intestate Inheritance Rights for
Unmarried Committed Partners, 81 OR. L. REV. 255, 257, 257 n.7 (2002).
139. See In re MacAdam's Estate, 45 Wash. 2d 527, 276 P.2d 729 (1954) (courts will seek for
and give effect to the intention of testator if it be lawful); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.230 (2004).
Since an unmarried person is not encumbered by WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (2004), there are no
restrictions on to whom the testate can devise property.
140. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (2004).
141. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.010, 020, 030 (2004).
142. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.12.010, 015(2) (2004); see supra note 134.
143. See Lomenzo, supra note 123, at 943-45, 944 n. 14.
144. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.015 (2004).
145. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (2004).
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three ways: (1) by marriage, (2) by separation, or (3) by the death of one
or both partners. In the first two categories, the meretricious doctrine will
grant legal protection to a non-title-holding meretricious partner's
equitable interests in property acquired during the course of the
relationship. However, in the third category it is not settled whether the
meretricious relationship doctrine will afford any protection to a non-
title-holding meretricious partner. In fact, no "court has [ever] employed
the doctrine to justify a post-demise distribution of property."'' 46 Two
Washington State Supreme Court justices wrote separately in Vasquez
specifically to state their views that the meretricious relationship doctrine
should not apply post mortem. 147 These two justices were concerned that,
if the doctrine applied post mortem, it would circumvent the State's
intestacy laws. Further, the two justices are of the opinion that a person
can only obtain property from the estate of an intestate through intestacy
laws. 148
A. Applying the Doctrine Post Mortem to Cases
Involving Meretricious Relationships Terminated
by Death would be Consistent with Prior Case Law
In Washington case law, five published opinions discuss the
question of property division after a meretricious relationship terminated
by the death of one of the partners: Creasman v. Boyle,149 In re Estate of
Thornton, 150 Latham v. Hennessey, 151 Peffley- Warner v. Bowen, 152 and
Vasquez v. Hawthorne. 53 In these cases the court never indicated that the
meretricious relationship doctrine could not be applied post mortem. To
the contrary, these cases suggest that applying the doctrine post mortem
would be consistent with the court's prior treatment of the doctrine.
In Creasman, the meretricious relationship ended by the death of
Caroline Paul, who held legal title to property accumulated during the
meretricious relationship, mostly from the wages of Harvey Creasman.' 54
After the trial court awarded Creasman one-half of Paul's estate, 55 the
146. Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 145 Wash. 2d 103, 114, 33 P.3d 735, 741 (2001) (Sanders, J.,
dissenting in part). However, this statement is not entirely true; see discussion of Peffley-Warner,
supra.
147. 145 Wash. 2d at 108-115, 33 P.3d at 738-41.
148. Id.
149. 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948).
150. 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972).
151.87 Wash. 2d 550, 554 P.2d 1075 (1976).
152. 113 Wash. 2d 243, 778 P.2d 1022 (1989).
153. 145 Wash. 2d 103, 33 P.3d 735 (2001).
154. 31 Wash. 2d at 347-49, 196 P.2d at 836.
155. Id. at 350, 196 P.2d at 838.
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Washington State Supreme Court reversed. 156 Importantly, in reversing
the appellate court, the supreme court did not express a concern that the
relationship was terminated by death. The outcome in Creasman would
have been the same whether the relationship terminated by separation or
death. Since the court based its decision on the newly created rebuttable
Creasman presumption, had the presumption been rebutted, the court
presumably would have allowed Creasman to take some of the property
in Paul's estate. Thus, applying the meretricious relationship doctrine
post mortem would be consistent with the Creasman court's treatment of
the doctrine.
In Thornton, Ron Thornton, although legally married, lived in a
meretricious relationship with Lucy Antoine. 157 That relationship
terminated by the death of Mr. Thornton,' 58 and Antoine brought suit
seeking a legal interest in Thornton's assets. 159 Although Antoine only
advanced her claim on the theory of an implied partnership or joint
venture, the court noted that she could have argued that she had a legal
interest in the assets of Thornton's estate because they lived in a
meretricious relationship. 60 The court noted that this argument would
likely run afoul of the Creasman presumption, but it also suggested that
this presumption should be overruled; 16 1 however, since Antoine did not
advance that theory, the court could not rule on it.162 As in Creasman, the
court did not suggest that the meretricious relationship doctrine could not
be applied post mortem. To the contrary, despite the fact the relationship
terminated by death, in dictum the court suggests that it would have
overruled the Creasman presumption and equitably divided the property
in question had Antoine advanced the meretricious relationship claim.
Therefore, applying the meretricious relationship doctrine post mortem
would be consistent with the Thornton court's statements regarding the
doctrine.
In Latham, the plaintiff, Don Latham, lived in a meretricious
relationship with Loretta Latham prior to their marriage.' 63 In this case,
the couple's meretricious relationship actually terminated by marriage,
not death. When the marriage terminated at Ms. Latham's death, Mr.
Latham attempted to apply the meretricious relationship doctrine to gain
156. Id. at 353, 196 P.2d at 839.
157. In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 74, 499 P.2d 864, 865 (1972).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 76-77, 499 P.2d at 866.
161. Id. at 77, 499 P.2d at 866-67.
162. Id. at 78-79, 499 P.2d at 867-68.
163. Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wash. 2d. 550, 551, 554 P.2d 1075, 1078 (1976).
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legal interest in a house the couple acquired during their cohabitation
prior to marriage. 164 Legal title to the house was in Ms. Latham's
name. 165 The trial court held that the property in question was the
separate property of Ms. Latham, and therefore, under the Creasman
presumption, Mr. Latham did not have an equitable interest in it. 166 On
appeal, Mr. Latham relied on dictum in Thornton167 and argued that the
Creasman presumption should be overruled and that the court should
equitably distribute the so-called separate property of his deceased
wife. 168 The court refused and held that the Creasman presumption was
not applicable to the case at bar.' 69 The court stated that the facts of the
case made clear that the parties intended to keep the house as separate
property of Ms. Latham.170 The court, therefore, refused to distribute an
equitable share to Mr. Latham 17' and, once again, did not express a
concern that Mr. Latham was attempting to use the meretricious doctrine
post mortem. The court's tacit acceptance of the meretricious
relationship doctrine as applied post mortem leads to a reasonable
inference that it would have overruled Creasman had there been
evidence that the parties did not intend to keep the house the separate
property of Ms. Latham.
In Peffley-Warner, appellant Marilyn Peffley-Warner lived in a
meretricious relationship with Sylvan Warner.172 Their relationship was
terminated by the death of Mr. Warner.173 Ms. Peffley-Warner attempted
to obtain widow benefits under the Social Security Act.' 74 The Social
Security Administration determined Ms. Peffley-Warner was not the
decedent's spouse, and therefore, denied the benefits. 75 On appeal, the
district court affirmed the Secretary of Health and Human Services
decision. 76 Ms. Peffley-Warner then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, '77 and the court certified the following question to the
164. Id. at 552, 554 P.2d at 1078.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972).
168.87 Wash. 2d at 552, 554 P.2d at 1058; see also Latham v. Hennessey, 13 Wash. App. 518,
521, 535 P.2d 838, 840 (1975).
169. Latham, 87 Wash. 2d at 552-53, 554 P.2d at 1058-59.
170. Id. at 553, 554 P.2d at 1059.
171. Id. at 523-24, 554 P.2d at 1059.
172. Peffley-Warner v. Bowen, 113 Wash. 2d 243, 244, 778 P.2d 1022, 1022-23 (1989).
173. Id. at 245, 778 P.2d at 1023.
174. Id. at 244, 778 P.2d at 1022.
175. Id. at 245-46, 778 P.2d at 1023.
176. Id. at 247, 778 P.2d at 1024.
177. Id. at 248, 778 P.2d at 1024.
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Washington Supreme Court: "Would Washington law afford a person in
Ms. Warner's situation the same status as that of a wife with respect to
the intestate devolution of Sylvan Warner's personal property?' 78 The
supreme court answered in the negative and held that a meretricious
partner was not a "surviving spouse" under Washington's intestate laws,
and therefore, is not entitled to inherit any assets of her partner's estate
through intestacy laws. 179
An important aspect of Peffley- Warner is that the opinion notes that
Ms. Peffley-Warner sought to apply the meretricious doctrine post
mortem to acquire an interest in property held in Mr. Warner's name.'80
Since the Creasman presumption was overruled five years earlier, the
probate court, after finding that the couple had lived in a meretricious
relationship, examined the equitable interests that Ms. Peffley-Warner
and Mr. Warner had in the property they jointly-acquired during the
relationship. 181 The court concluded that Ms. Peffley-Warner had a
$1,500 equitable interest in the property.18 2 This award was not disturbed
on appeal. 183 Further, the supreme court did not make the slightest
indication that it was concerned about the probate court applying the
meretricious relationship doctrine post mortem. 8 4 Thus, applying the
meretricious relationship doctrine post mortem would be entirely
consistent with the court's treatment of the doctrine in Peffley-Warner.
The last and most recent case involving a meretricious relationship
terminated by death is Vasquez. 185 In this case, Frank Vasquez and
Robert Schwerzler cohabitated for approximately twenty-six years until
the relationship terminated by the death of Schwerzler. 86 The two men
had accumulated significant assets during their relationship, all of which
were in Schwerzler's name. 1 7 Vasquez brought a claim arguing, inter
alia, that he had an equitable interest in Schwerzler's assets under the
178. Id. at 245, 778 P.2d at 1023.
179. Id. at 253, 778 P.2d at 1027.
180. Id. at 246-47, 778 P.2d at 1023-24.
181. Id. at 246-47, 252, 778 P.2d at 1023-24, 1026-27.
182. Id. at 247, 252, 778 P.2d at 1024, 1026-27.
183. Id. at 252, 778 P.2d at 1026-27. As far as the opinion shows, this judgment was not
appealed, but the court noted this ruling of the probate court with approval.
184. Id. at 246-47, 252, 778 P.2d at 1023-24, 1026-27. The court acknowledged that the
probate court applied the meretricious relationship doctrine post mortem and granted an equitable
lien in the amount of $1,500 to Ms. Peffiey-Warner based on this doctrine and did not make any
indication that applying the doctrine post mortem was improper. In fact, the opinion seems to
approve of the probate court's ruling.
185. Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 145 Wash. 2d 103, 33 P.3d 735 (2001).
186. Id. at 106, 33 P.3d at 737.
187. Id. at 107, 33 P.3d at 737.
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meretricious relationship doctrine. 8 8 The trial court applied the doctrine
post mortem, and after determining the equitable interests of the parties,
ordered a distribution of the assets. 189 The administrator of Schwerzler's
estate, Hawthorne, appealed. 190 The appellate court reversed simply
because it did not believe the doctrine applied to same sex couples'
9 1
and, further, did not indicate that the doctrine could not be applied post
mortem. The Washington State Supreme Court reversed, finding that the
issue of whether a meretricious relationship existed was improperly
determined on a summary judgment motion,' 92 and remanded the case to
the trial court for a trial on the issue of whether a meretricious
relationship existed. 193 Again, the majority did not indicate that the
doctrine could not be applied post mortem. To the contrary, the fact that
the supreme court remanded for trial, despite the fact that the relationship
terminated by death, reveals the court's willingness to apply the doctrine
post mortem. Hence, applying the meretricious relationship doctrine post
mortem is entirely consistent with the Vasquez court's treatment of the
doctrine.
Two Justices in Vasquez, however, dissented in part because they
did not believe the meretricious relationship doctrine should apply post
mortem. 194 They argued that applying the doctrine post mortem would be
inconsistent with the State's intestacy laws. 195 Chief Justice Alexander
wrote:
I write separately simply to indicate my agreement with Justice
Sanders' view that the meretricious relationship doctrine is unavailable
to a party who seeks relief when, as is the case here, one party to the
alleged meretricious relationship is deceased ... the laws of intestacy,
RCW 11.04.015-.290, dictate how property is to be distributed when an
individual dies without a will. Accordingly, we have held that the
meretricious relationship doctrine[] . . . does not apply when a
relationship between unmarried cohabitants is terminated by the death
of one cohabitant. Peffley- Warner v. Bowen [citation omitted]. 196
Justice Sanders wrote:
188. Id. at 108,33 P.3d at 738.
189. Id. at 104-05, 33 P.3d at 736.
190. Id. at 105, 33 P.3d at 736.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 107, 33 P.3d at 737.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 108-15, 33 P.3d at 738-41.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 108-09, 33 P.3d at 738.
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The first consideration involves the unavailability of the
meretricious relationship doctrine to relationships terminated by death.
This court has never employed the doctrine to justify a post-demise
distribution of property. In Peffley- Warner v. Bowen [citation omitted],
we answered the certified question in the negative, "Would Washington
law afford a person in Ms. Warner's situation the same status as that of
a wife with respect to the intestate devolution of Sylvan Warner's
personal property[.]" 1
97
As the aforementioned discussion indicates, in every case where a
meretricious relationship has terminated by death, courts have shown no
hesitancy in applying the doctrine post mortem, notwithstanding the
dissent in Vasquez. Hence, applying the doctrine post mortem would be
entirely consistent with precedent.
B. Contrary to the Dissenters'Argument in Vasquez,
Applying the Doctrine Post Mortem will not Conflict
with the State's Intestacy Laws or with Peffley- Warner
Applying the meretricious relationship doctrine post mortem will
not circumvent Washington's intestacy laws nor conflict with Peffley-
Warner. First, it should be noted that Chief Justice Alexander utterly
misstated the holding in Peffley-Warner. Chief Justice Alexander
misconstrues Peffley- Warner as holding that "the meretricious
relationship doctrine[] . . . does not apply when a relationship between
unmarried cohabitants is terminated by the death of one cohabitant."
'1 98
Not only is this a completely inaccurate characterization of Peffley-
Warner's holding, but there is no dictum in that opinion that supports
Chief Justice Alexander's proposition. A correct statement of the
holding, according to the Peffley-Warner court itself, is:
[U]nder Washington law, a surviving partner in a "meretricious"
relationship does not have the status of a widow with respect to
intestate devolution of the deceased partner's personal property. The
division of property following termination of an unmarried cohabitating
relationship is based on equity, contract or trust, and not on
inheritance. 199
This statement clearly reveals that the court's holding was simply that a
meretricious partner does not qualify as a "surviving spouse" under the
197. Id. at 114, 33 P.3d at 741 (internal citations omitted).
198. Id. at 109, 33 P.3d at 738.
199. Peffley-Warner v. Bowen, 113 Wash. 2d 243, 253, 778 P.2d 1022, 1027 (1989) (emphasis
added).
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State's intestacy laws. Applying the meretricious doctrine post mortem is
not synonymous with treating a meretricious partner as a spouse for
purposes of the intestacy laws. Furthermore, under the Peffley-Warner
court's holding, a meretricious partner can obtain a distribution of a
deceased partner's assets under equitable doctrines.20 0 The meretricious
doctrine is undoubtedly one of the equitable doctrines to which the court
referred. 20' Further, when writing this decision, the court clearly had in
mind the situation of a meretricious relationship terminating by death.20 2
Lastly, Chief Justice Alexander neglected to mention that the probate
court in Peffley-Warner had applied the meretricious relationship
doctrine post mortem, and the supreme court gave notice to this without
203indicating any disapproval whatsoever.
Although Justice Sanders correctly quoted Peffley-Warner,2 0 4 he
also stated that "this court has never employed the doctrine to justify a
post-demise distribution of property. 20 5 While this statement is literally
true, it is misleading. The supreme court has acquiesced in a lower
court's application of the doctrine post mortem, ironically, in the very
case both Justice Sanders and Chief Justice Alexander cite to support
206their proposition-Peffley- Warner. Further, Justice Sanders quotes,
without an explanation of how it supports his proposition, the following
statement from Peffley- Warner: "Lindsey did not expand the rights of a
surviving partner in an unmarried cohabitating relationship to the
personal property of a deceased partner., 20 7 While this statement is
accurate, it does not support the proposition that the meretricious
doctrine should not be applied post mortem. Lindsey overruled the
200. Id.
201. There are only a few equitable doctrines that have been used to distribute property upon
the termination of a meretricious relationship: meretricious relationship doctrine, constructive trust,
traceable funds doctrine, and implied partnership. See supra Part II.A.3. The Peffley-Warner court
specifically stated "The division of property following termination of an unmarried cohabitating
relationship is based on equi, contract or trust and is not on inheritance." Since the court
specifically stated "trust," it could not have been referring to a constructive trust when it referred to
"equity." Further, since the Lindsey opinion, overruling the Creasman presumption and creating the
current meretricious relationship doctrine, was published only five years before the court wrote the
Peffley-Warner opinion, the Peffley-Warner court was surely referring to the meretricious
relationship doctrine when it referred to "equity" as a means to distribute meretricious partners'
property.
202. This is evidenced by the fact that Ms. Peffley-Warner's meretricious relationship
terminated by the death of her partner.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 180-184.
204. Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 145 Wash. 2d 103, 114, 33 P.3d 735, 741 (2001).
205. Id.
206. Peffley-Wamer v. Bowen, 113 Wash. 2d 243, 778 P.2d 1022 (1989).
207. Vasquez, 145 Wash. 2d at 114, 33 P.3d at 741 (emphasis added).
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Creasman presumption, which was created in a case where the
meretricious relationship was terminated by death.208 The supreme court
in Creasman did not indicate any hesitancy in applying the doctrine post
mortem. 209 Thus, in 1948 when the Creasman presumption was created,
the doctrine arguably applied post mortem if the Creasman presumption
could be rebutted. When Lindsey overruled the Creasman presumption,
the doctrine arguably continued to apply post mortem; thus, while it may
be true that Lindsey did not expand the rights of a surviving cohabitant, it
does not follow, as Justice Sanders' unarticulated inference seems to
suggest, that the meretricious relationship doctrine cannot apply post
mortem.2 10 Applying the doctrine post mortem would not be expanding a
cohabitant's rights. Further, it is highly unlikely that the Peffley-Warner
court intended the quoted statement to stand for the proposition that
Justice Sanders seems to think it supports, since the court in that case
acquiesced in the probate court's application of the meretricious
relationship doctrine post mortem.
Not only is the application of the meretricious relationship doctrine
post mortem consistent with precedent, it is also consistent with
Washington's intestacy laws.
C. Applying the Meretricious Doctrine Post Mortem
does not Conflict with Intestacy Laws
1. Present Inchoate Unliquidated Interest
No reported Washington case has held that the meretricious
relationship doctrine creates a present inchoate interest in the non-title-
holding meretricious partner. However, when faced with this question, a
court should hold that the doctrine creates such an interest.
The meretricious relationship doctrine is analogous to the judicially
created doctrine of dower. 21' At common law, dower is an interest that a
208. In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d 299, 678 P.2d 328 (1984).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 73-78.
210. Vasquez, 145 Wash. 2d at 114, 33 P.3d at 741.
211. The doctrine of dower was originally a judicial creation, which some state legislatures
have subsequently enacted by statute. See Carter v. King, 353 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 1987). This analogy
is used only to show that the meretricious relationship doctrine creates an inchoate present interest.
There are some aspects of dower that are not analogous to the meretricious relationship doctrine. For
example, under the doctrine of dower, all real property acquired during marriage is encumbered,
which affects the alienability of the property. The author of this Article does not argue that the
meretricious relationship doctrine encumbers the property the couple acquires during the
relationship. Under the meretricious relationship doctrine, if the title-holding partner squanders away
joint property, the non-title-holding partner should receive a creditor's interest against the title-
holding partner.
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wife acquires in the estate of her husband.12 When the husband dies, the
wife has a right to one-third of all the real property of which her husband
seised during marriage. 213 A right to dower arises when the following
factors are satisfied: (1) a valid marriage, (2) the seisin of real property
by the deceased spouse during marriage, (3) by an estate of inheritance,
and (4) the death of one spouse.214 During marriage, courts have held that
dower creates a present inchoate interest. 215 The inchoate interest arises
when there is a valid marriage and seisin of real property by the husband
during the marriage by an estate of inheritance.216 Although the inchoate
interest is not a vested right, it is a present interest in real property. 217 The
inchoate interest constitutes an encumbrance on the title to the real
property, 2 18 and the inchoate interest vests or accrues when a spouse
dies.219 Courts have also held that the right to dower is separate and
distinct from rights under intestacy laws.22°
Similar to the doctrine of dower, the meretricious relationship
doctrine gives a non-title-holding partner an interest in the couple's
property when the relationship later terminates. The meretricious
relationship doctrine requires certain factors to exist for the creation of a
property right in the non-title-holding partner. Those factors include (1) a
stable marital-like relationship; (2) knowledge that a valid marriage does
not exist; (3) intent to live in a meretricious relationship; (4) a pooling of
resources and services; and (5) a termination of the relationship. 22' As
with the doctrine of dower, where courts have held the doctrine creates a
present inchoate interest when all the factors of the doctrine are satisfied
except the death of the spouse, Washington courts should hold that the
meretricious relationship doctrine creates a present inchoate interest
when all the factors are satisfied except the termination of the
relationship.
This analysis makes sense when consideration is given to how
courts apply the meretricious relationship doctrine. In applying the
doctrine, a court will first look to see if the Connell factors were present
212. See Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216 (1934).
213. Chaplin v. Chaplin, 24 Eng. Rep. 1040 (1733).
214. See Loughran, 292 U.S. 216 (1934).
215. In re Estate of Wulf, 471 N.W.2d 850 (Iowa 1991).
216. See Loughran, 292 U.S. 216 (1934).
217. See In re Miller, 151 B.R. 800 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
218. Sykes v. Chadwick, 85 U.S. 141 (1873).
219. Thompson v. McCorkle, 36 N.E. 211 (Ind. 1893).
220. Carter v. King, S.E.2d 738 (Va. 1987).
221. Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 898 P.2d 831 (1995); see also Peffley-Wamer v.
Bowen, 113 Wash. 2d 243, 778 P.2d 1022 (1989) (the court stated that the division of property
follows a termination of a meretricious relationship).
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during the relationship,2 22 and if those factors are present, the court will
apply the doctrine, and then determine what equitable property rights the
non-title-holding partner possesses.223 This application of the doctrine is
entirely consistent with the idea that the doctrine creates a present
inchoate property interest. When the Connell factors exist during a
relationship, the relationship is legally defined as a meretricious
relationship, even though the relation has not terminated. At the moment
the Connell factors are met, a present inchoate interest arises in the non-
title-holding partner. When the relationship terminates, the inchoate
interest vests, and the non-title-holding partner then has a cause of
action. When a cause of action is brought, a court will verify that the
Connell factors existed, and then equitably distribute property the couple
had acquired during the relationship.
Further, holding that the meretricious relationship doctrine creates a
present inchoate interest will protect cohabitants' equitable rights and
further the purpose of the doctrine. A non-title-holding partner will be
protected from the title-holding partner giving, devising, or selling
property without the consent of the non-title-holding partner. It is
conceivable that a meretricious partner might create a will, which
excludes the non-title-holding partner. If the meretricious relationship
doctrine did not create a present inchoate interest, the surviving partner
would be divested of his or her equitable interest in jointly-acquired
property. This would be unconscionable, unfair, and result in the unjust
enrichment of the devisees. A person can only devise what he or she
owns. 224 If the meretricious relationship doctrine creates a present
inchoate interest, then one partner cannot devise property in which the
other has an inchoate interest. Thus, before any will can be executed, the
court must first determine, by applying the meretricious relationship
doctrine, whether the property devised in the will belonged to the
devisor. If the court finds that the non-title-holding partner has an
equitable interest in such property, the court would be required to refuse
to execute the will with regard to that property, thereby protecting the
equitable interests of the surviving partner.
Additionally, holding that the meretricious relationship doctrine
creates a present inchoate interest in which one partner cannot devise
property the other has an equitable interest in is analogous to Wash. Rev.
Code § 26.16.030. This statute prohibits married persons from devising,
222. See Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 145 Wash. 2d 103, 33 P.3d 735 (2001) (court first determines
if there is a meretricious relationship).
223. See Connell, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 898 P.2d 831.
224. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.
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gifting or selling more than his or her one-half interest in community
property without the consent of the other spouse. The purpose of this
statute is indisputably to prevent one spouse from being divested of his
or her community property interest without consenting thereto. This
equitable purpose should apply equally to meretricious partners. The
supreme court proclaimed in Vasquez, "when equitable claims are
brought, the focus remains on the equities involved between the
parties.,, 225 It is undeniably inequitable to allow a title-holding partner to
devise or sell property for his or her personal enrichment, when the non-
title-holding partner has helped acquire the property and has not
consented to the devise or sale. It is also inequitable to allow a title-
holding partner to devise property in which another has an equitable
interest. The devisee will be unjustly enriched by receiving property the
devisor did not fully own, and the non-title-holding partner would be
deprived of property in which he or she had an equitable interest. Courts
should construe the meretricious relationship doctrine in such a way as to
prevent such inequities. By creating a present inchoate property interest,
the meretricious relationship doctrine would do just that.
2. Rights Granted under the Meretricious Relationship Doctrine
are Independent and Distinct from Rights under Intestacy Laws
If the meretricious relationship doctrine creates a present inchoate
interest in the non-title-holding partner, applying the doctrine post
mortem will not circumvent intestacy laws. As with the doctrine of
dower, courts should hold that the meretricious relationship doctrine
creates property rights separate and distinct from intestacy laws. 226
Intestacy laws control how the estate of a person who has died intestate
will be distributed.227 Before a court can distribute an estate under
intestacy laws, it must first determine what assets belong to the estate.
An estate can only consist of property that belonged to the decedent. 228
Hence, a court must first determine what the decedent owned. This is the
point at which the meretricious relationship doctrine applies.
When a meretricious relationship terminates by the death of one of
the partners, the inchoate property interest of the non-title-holding
225. 145 Wash. 2d at 107, 33 P.3d at 737.
226. Carter v. King, 353 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 1987) (holding that the doctrine of right to dower is
separate and distinct from rights under intestacy laws).
227. See discussion supra Part 111.
228. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.005(2) (2004) ("'net estate' refers to the real and personal
property of decedent ...."); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.070 (2004) (spouse's one-half interest in
community property is not part of decedent's net estate).
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partner will vest because the relationship has been terminated. If the
decedent was the title-holding partner, the property subject to the
inchoate interest will not pass to the decedent's estate because such
property does not belong to the decedent. Thus, a court must first apply
the meretricious relationship doctrine to determine what belonged to the
decedent. Only after applying the doctrine and making an equitable
distribution is it possible to determine what the decedent owned. Once a
court determines what belonged to the decedent, it can make a
distribution of the estate under the intestacy laws. The survivor is
receiving property under the meretricious relationship doctrine, not
inheriting from the estate under intestacy laws; thus, the meretricious
relationship doctrine does not run afoul of intestacy laws. Likewise, if
the decedent is the non-title-holding partner, his or her inchoate interest
will vest at the moment of death and will pass to his or her estate. The
estate will then have a cause of action under the meretricious relationship
doctrine for an equitable distribution.
D. The Policies Underlying the Meretricious Relationship
Doctrine Compel Applying the Doctrine Post Mortem
Applying the doctrine post mortem further supports the purpose of
the meretricious relationship doctrine, which is to prevent unjust
enrichment. 229 Termination of the relationship by death instead of
separation or marriage does not eliminate the possibility of unjust
enrichment. If a meretricious partner who has an equitable interest in the
couple's property cannot realize that interest because the relationship has
terminated by death, then the estate of the decedent will be unjustly
enriched. Likewise, if the survivor is the title-holding partner, the
survivor will be unjustly enriched at the expense of the estate if the
decedent's estate cannot realize the decedent's equitable interest.
In addition, a court would apply the doctrine if the parties had
terminated their relationship by separating and the ex-non-title-holding
partner brought suit under the meretricious relationship doctrine to
realize his or her equitable interest in property. 230 It is also evident that, if
in the above scenario, the ex-title-holding-partner died subsequent to the
non-title-holding partner bringing suit but before a court ruled on the
division of property, a court would still apply the meretricious
229. Peffley-Wamer v. Bowen, 113 Wash. 2d 243, 252, 778 P.2d 1022, 1026-27 (1989).
230. See, e.g., Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 898 P.2d 831 (1995) (applying the
meretricious relationship doctrine after an unmarried cohabitating couple separated to equitably
divide property accumulated during the course of the relationship).
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relationship doctrine. 231 The same logic suggests that, if the ex-title-
holding partner died after the couple separated but before the ex-non-
title-holding partner brought suit, a court would apply the doctrine. To
stretch this logic further, imagine a meretricious relationship terminating
by separation. Five minutes after the separation, the ex-title-holding-
partner dies in a car accident. If the ex-non-title-holding-partner brings
suit under the meretricious relationship doctrine, a court would likely
apply it because the relationship terminated by separation. 32
Why should there be a different outcome if the couple separated
five minutes before one of their deaths or the relationship was terminated
by the death itself? How the relationship terminated does not affect the
equities of the parties. It is utterly unjust to treat a relationship that
terminates by separation differently than one that terminates by death. As
the Washington State Supreme Court has stated, "when equitable claims
are brought, the focus remains on the equities involved between the
parties. ' ' 233 Since the meretricious relationship doctrine is an equitable
doctrine, and the equities between the partners do not change simply
because the relationship terminates by death, the fact the relationship
terminated by death should have no affect on the applicability of the
doctrine.
Furthermore, if the court refuses to apply the meretricious doctrine
post mortem, it will in effect be reinstating a Creasman-like presumption
for meretricious relationships that terminate by death. This new
presumption would be that when a meretricious relationship terminates
by death, unless there is clear evidence that the plaintiff actually held
title to the property, the court will presume that the property belongs to
the person who holds title at the time the relationship terminated. Since
the Washington State Supreme Court overruled the Creasman
presumption because it believed the rule was too harsh 234 and this new
231. See Niemela v. Kalkwarf, No. 53484-0-I, 2005 WL 519061, at * 1 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 7,
2005); cf In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d 299, 678 P.2d 328 (1984) (applying the
meretricious relationship doctrine to divide property a couple had accumulated during their
cohabitation prior to marriage. The couple cohabitated for less than two years when their
meretricious relationship terminated by the fact they got married. After being married for
approximately five years, the couple filed for divorce. The wife brought suit under the meretricious
relationship doctrine to acquire a legal interest in property the couple had accumulated during their
previous cohabitation. This case shows that events subsequent to the termination of the meretricious
relationship are irrelevant. Although the cohabitation terminated five years earlier, the court only
focused on the fact there was a meretricious relationship at one time, and during that time property
was acquired by the couple).
232. See Connell, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 898 P.2d 831.
233. Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 145 Wash. 2d 103, 107, 33 P.3d 735, 737 (2001).
234. See In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d 299, 678 P.2d 328 (1984).
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presumption would be just as severe, it too would be overturned if
implemented.
F. Applying the Meretricious Relationship Doctrine Post Mortem
will not Re-Create Common Law Marriage
Applying the meretricious relationship doctrine post mortem will
not re-create common law marriage, which Washington does not
recognize.23 5 First, the parties will not be deemed married simply by
applying the doctrine post mortem.236 Second, applying the doctrine post
mortem will not result in treating meretricious partners the same as
married persons. With regard to distribution of property after the death of
an intestate, married persons and meretricious partners do not enjoy the
same rights. A spouse of a decedent 237 inherits from the decedent's estate
through the intestacy laws. 238 The assets that the surviving spouse
inherits are proscribed by statute.239 On the other hand, a survivor of a
meretricious relationship does not inherit from the decedent's estate.
Rather, the meretricious survivor is entitled to receive a fair and
equitable division of property accumulated by joint efforts.24 °
Although it is impossible to determine whether or not the
application of the meretricious relationship doctrine will be more
advantageous to a cohabitant in comparison to a similarly situated spouse
who inherits under the intestacy laws, the distribution under intestacy
laws likely would be more advantageous. Under intestacy laws, the
decedent's separate property is before the court for distribution. 241
Conversely, under the meretricious doctrine, only property that was
acquired during the relationship is before the court for equitable
distribution.2 42
235. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
236. See Peffley-Warner v. Bowen, 113 Wash. 2d 243, 252, 778 P.2d 1022, 1027 (1989) (a
meretricious relationship is not marriage).
237. Id.
238. See discussion supra Part 111.
239. See discussion supra Part 111.
240. See In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d 299, 304, 678 P.2d 328, 331 (1984)
(property accumulated during a meretricious relationship will be distributed in a just and equitable
manner).
241. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.015 (2004).
242. Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 898 P.2d 831 (1995). It should be noted,
however, that the application of the meretricious relationship doctrine post mortem could affect third
party creditors. It is conceivable that parties may try to use doctrine to avoid third party obligations.
For example, if a meretricious couple is involved in a car accident, killing themselves and causing
severe injuries to third persons, the injured persons will have a tort claim against the negligent
driver. If title to all the couple's assets is in the driver's name, the estate of the non-negligent partner
may try to apply the meretricious doctrine post mortem in an attempt to protect the non-negligent
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There are additional advantages afforded to married persons that are
not available to unmarried cohabitants. For instance, since a meretricious
partner is not considered a "spouse," 243 the partner does not qualify for
many statutory and contractual benefits. A meretricious partner does not
qualify for benefits triggered by a "marital status" provision under
Washington's unemployment compensation statute.244 A meretricious
partner is not entitled to attorney fees in a meretricious relationship
property distribution case, although a married person is entitled to
attorney fees in similar actions. 245 A meretricious partner is not
considered a member of an insured's immediate family for purposes of
insurance benefits. 246 Additionally, a meretricious partner is not
considered a spouse for purposes of Washington's wrongful death
statute.
247
There are many differences between marriage and meretricious
relationships, and these differences will not be affected by applying the
meretricious relationship doctrine post mortem. Applying the doctrine
post mortem will in no way recreate common law marriage. Lastly, since
there are so many advantages available only to married persons, applying
the doctrine post mortem will not discourage the institution of marriage.
partner's equitable interest in the assets from being reached by the plaintiffs (the third party
creditors). This is because there is currently no rule that the meretricious community will be liable
for an unintentional tort committed by one meretricious partner, even if the tort was committed
during an activity that benefited the meretricious community. If the negligent partner's estate is
insolvent, this will create a serious problem. If the couple had been married and if the car was being
used for the mutual benefit of the marital community, their joint property would have been reachable
by the plaintiffs for the damages caused by the negligent driving. See Allen v. Univ. of Wash., 140
Wash. 2d 323, 336, 997 P.2d 360, 367 (2000) (marital community is liable for spouses' torts
committed during the community activity) (citing deElche v. Jacobsen, 95, Wash. 2d 237, 245, 622,
P.2d 835, 839-40 (1980), and characterizing deElche as having held that "Torts which can properly
be said to be done in the management of community business, or for the benefit of the community,
will remain community torts with the community and the tort-feasor separately liable."); see also
Haley v. Highland, 142 Wash. 2d 135, 12 P.3d 119 (2000). Obviously, applying the doctrine to
avoid third party creditors is unjust. A party should not be able to use the doctrine post mortem to
avoid third party liability, a maneuver not available to married persons. Allowing the doctrine to
apply to the detriment of third party creditors would undercut the purpose of the doctrine-to further
just and equitable results. Additionally, allowing such a maneuver would result in treating
cohabitants more favorably than married persons, thus undercutting and discouraging the institution
of marriage. However, this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. This issue is raised here merely
to stimulate thought and hopefully encourage future articles that will aid the courts in further
developing the meretricious relationship doctrine.
243. Peffley-Wamer v. Bowen, 113 Wash. 2d 243, 778 P.2d 1022 (1989).
244. Davis v. Dept. of Employment Sec., 108 Wash. 2d 272, 737 P.2d 1262 (1987).
245. W. Comm'ty Bank v. Helmer, 48 Wash. App. 694, 740 P.2d 359 (1987).
246. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Weaver, 48 Wash. App. 607, 739 P.2d 1192 (1987).
247. Roe v. Ludtke Trucking, Inc., 46 Wash. App. 816, 732 P.2d 1021 (1987).
Seattle University Law Review
VI. CONCLUSION
Although property rights of cohabitants have come a long way
since the court created the Creasman presumption, the meretricious
relationship doctrine, as it now stands, is still under-developed. No
reported case has ever expressly held that the doctrine is applicable post
mortem. However, as this Article has shown, the doctrine should be
applicable post mortem. First, applying the doctrine post mortem would
be consistent with precedent. Second, contrary to the dissent in Vasquez,
applying the doctrine post mortem would not conflict with Peffley-
Warner. Further, applying the meretricious relationship doctrine post
mortem does not circumvent intestacy laws. Only property that belonged
to a decedent becomes part of the decedent's estate; thus, the first
question is always, "What belonged to the decedent?" Since the
meretricious relationship doctrine creates a present inchoate interest in
the non-title-holding partner, a court must first apply the meretricious
relationship doctrine to determine what the decedent owned. The
intestacy laws come into play only after applying the meretricious
relationship doctrine. At this stage, it is conceded that the meretricious
partner cannot obtain property through the intestacy laws because the
court in Peffley- Warner held a meretricious partner is not a "spouse." In
addition, the purpose of the meretricious doctrine-to prevent unjust
enrichment-further supports applying the doctrine post mortem. If the
doctrine is not applied post mortem, either the survivor or the estate of
the decedent will be unjustly enriched by keeping property that the other
partner helped accumulate. Lastly, applying the meretricious relationship
doctrine post mortem will not re-create common law marriage. The
meretricious doctrine should be applied post mortem to effectuate the
purpose for which the court created the doctrine in the first place: a just
and equitable distribution of property upon the termination of a
meretricious relationship.
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